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TORTS - RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE UNACCOMPANIED
BY PHYSICAL INJURY - Appellee brought an action in tort to recover damages
for mental anguish suffered when appellant had an autopsy performed upon the
body of her deceased husband. Appellant had been requested to perform the postmortem by decedent's employer, who was authorized under the state workmen's
compensation act to require an autopsy. The act also provided that no autopsy
should be held without notice first being given to the widow or next of kin
and an opportunity given to have a representative present to witness the same.
The only effect under the act of a failure to give notice was to render inadmissible the evidence obtained by such autopsy. The requisite notice was found
not to have been given. Appellant demurred to the complaint on the grounds
that since no actual physical injury was involved there could be no recovery
for mental suffering, and that there must be an allegation that the acts of
appellant were willful and wanton and performed with the intention of injuring the appellee. Held, demurrer overruled; mental suffering and mental
anguish need not necessarily be accompanied by physical injury where defendant's act was willful or wrongful, or was an unlawful act which resulted in the
invasion of the legal rights of another. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Burton,
(Ind. App. 1938) 12 N. E. (2d) 360.
Although the result reached by the court in the principal case may be
a proper one, it is rather difficult to justify it upon the grounds stated and the
authorities cited by the court. In support of the first of these grounds-viz., that
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mental suffering and mental anguish need not necessarily be accompanied by
physical injury where defendant's act was willful or wrongful-the court cites
Wolf v. Trinkle 1 and McCarty v. Kinsey. 2 These cases, however, cannot support such a doctrine, as in both cases the emotional disturbance was accompanied
by physical injury. Likewise in support of the doctrine, the court relies upon
Kline v. Kline 8 and Meek v. State:' Here the wrongful acts were designed
and intended to frighten plaintiff, but such intent is not to be found in the
principal case. In fact, there is good authority for appellant's contention that a
complaint alleging willful injury must be strictly construed and must show that
the injurious act was purposely done with the intent to inflict the particular
injury of which complaint is made. 5 Although this rather strict requirement
has been tempered by decisions holding that "intent" may be inferred from
conduct showing a reckless disregard of consequences,6 these decisions have no
bearing upon the principal case in the absence of facts showing such conduct.
The second ground upon which the court based its decision-viz., that recovery
may be had for mental suffering arising out of an unlawful act which resulted in
the invasion of the legal rights of another-is too broad and sweeping to find
support in sound legal principles. This doctrine would permit recovery for
mental anguish alone arising out of mere negligence, a result which is rejected
by the overwhelming weight of authority. On the other hand, the decision
can be justified on the principle that recovery for mental distress may be permitted as an aggravation of damages when a legal wrong existed independently
of the mental suffering and when the suffering was reasonably foreseeable from
the legal wrong. There is ample and respectable authority for this rule, 1 and the
1 103 Ind. 355, 3 N. E. 110 (1885) (plaintiff allowed to recover damages for
mental anguish arising out of an indecent assault and battery upon her person).
2
154 Ind. 447, 57 N. E. 108 (1900) (plaintiff allowed to recover damages for
mental anguish arising from assault and battery).
8
158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9, 58 L. R. A. 397 (1902) (plaintiff allowed to
recover damages for fright suffered when defendant pointed a pistol at her for the
purpose of frightening her).
~ 205 Ind. 102, 185 N. E. 899 (1933) (plaintiff allowed to recover damages
for fright suffered when defendant attempted to frighten her for the purpose of
extorting money. See La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253
N. W. 424 (1934); Barnett v, Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W.
25 (1932); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925); Wilson v.
Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S. W. (2d) 428 (1930).
5
Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Ferrell, 39 Ind. App. 515, 78 N. E. 988 (1906); Kalen
v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Ry., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N. E. 694 (1897).
6
Gregory v. C. C. C. & I. Ry., 112 Ind. 385, 14 N. E. 228 (1887).
7 Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822, 21 Am. St. Rep. 249 at 258
(1890); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N. E. 251 (1928); Davidson v.
Lee, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 139 S. W. 904; Stiles v. Morse, 233 Mass. 174, 123
N. E. 615, 4 A. L. R. 1365 at 1371 (1919); Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72,
129 N. W. 177, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98 (1910); Austro-American S. S. Co. v.
Thomas, (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) 248 F. 231. There is some question as to whether
the autopsy in the principal case was really illegal, inasmuch as it was authorized by the
workmen's compensation act. Although the act also provided that no autopsy should be
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autopsy in the principal case was an independent legal wrong from which the
mental suffering was reasonably foreseeable. In summation, it would appear
that the court's decision can be justified but not on the ground given or the
authorities cited. Specifically, the court seems to have adopted a meaning of
"willful act" not followed in the cases relied upon.

performed without first serving notice on the widow, the failure to do so was made to
effect merely the admission of evidence, and it is questionable under such circumstances
as to whether a failure to serve notice should convert an otherwise legal autopsy
into an illegal one. Also, it is not certain as to whether appellee suffered the emotional disturbance when she learned that the autopsy had been performed or only when
she actually saw the lacerated body of her deceased husband. If the latter is true, then
there may be some doubt that liability for the mental anguish should be imposed upon
appellant. The reason suggested for non-liability is that it is conceivable that appellee
would have suffered the same mental anguish. upon seeing the body even though the
autopsy had been authorized by her. In other words, the fact that the autopsy was
unauthorized would not be the cause of the mental distress. Assuming this to be true,
the question might then narrow itself to one simply of negligence in the actual performance of the autopsy, with the weight of authority refusing recovery in the absence
of a showing of gross negligence.

